Licht uit en wat nog … Brown-Out ? Black-Out ?

Posted on August 18, 2014
Filed Under Uncategorized | Comments Off

 

[Brussel, Zele] – De stilstand van drie kernreactoren, de beschadiging van een transformator te Monceau-sur-Sambre, en andere technische beperkingen van het Belgische elektriciteitsnet zorgen dat bij stijgend verbruik het zogenaamde “evenwicht” tussen vraag en aanbod niet langer kan gewaarborgd worden. Wellicht zelfs niet met het terug in dienst stellen van elektrische centrales die om economische redenen (ze waren niet meer winstgevend) gewoon zijn stilgelegd.

k_96A (640x191) (2)

 

Alles draait om evenwicht. Hoe meer elektriciteit verbruikt wordt, door ziekenhuizen, bedrijven, gezinnen, openbaar vervoer, hoe meer er moet geproduceerd worden. Het probleem is dat men geen “levertermijn” kan hebben.
De aanpassing van productie aan een stijging van de vraag moet in fracties van seconden gebeuren.

Die “productie” kan op twee manieren:

 

Het dubbele probleem van nu …

Vorige winters waarschuwde netbeheerder Elia al dat het mogelijk was dat er stroomtekorten gingen zijn. Toen waren er twee reactoren buiten dienst en kon men op volle capaciteit elektriciteit transporteren vanuit Frankrijk om te gebruiken in België.
Die situatie is recentelijk fundamenteel veranderd:

Noodmaatregelen
Bij wet is vastgelegd dat Elia, als netwerkbeheerder, de taak heeft de (elektrische) veiligheid van ons elektriciteitsnet te bewaken en te beheren.
Elia, de nationale TSO (Transmission System Operator), werkt hiervoor samen met:

Dagelijks, uurlijks, worden aanpassingen gedaan in productie en transport van elektriciteit om het elektrisch net in werking te houden, zonder dat de doorsnee gebruiker zich daarvan bewust is.
Dit zijn de daily operations.

Als deze gewone kleine ingrepen onvoldoende zijn, kan de TSO een hele reeks noodmaatregelen nemen, tot en met het buiten dienst stellen van een gedeelte of het geheel van ons nationaal elektriciteitsnet.
Soms kan het inderdaad zelfs noodzakelijk zijn om “alles uit te schakelen” om nog erger te voorkomen.
Want alle nationale elektriciteitsnetwerken zijn onderling verbonden en een zeer ernstig nationaal probleem kan, als er niet goed op gereageerd wordt, overslaan naar het grotere internationale netwerk.

 

Black-out en Brown-out

Het bewust uitschakelen van een gedeelte van het elektriciteitsnet, het zogenaamde “afschakelen”, heeft tot doel het evenwicht tussen productie en verbruik te herstellen indien men de productie niet kan opvoeren.
Men “knipt” dus een stuk verbruik weg.
 
In sommige gevallen is het verlies van aanbod zo dramatisch en groot dat het afschakelen automatisch gebeurt.
Pylonen van een hoogspanningslijn die omvallen bij een storm, een brand in een transformator, zijn plotse gebeurtenissen die stroomafwaarts leiden tot een stroomuitval van een straat, wijk, gemeente of …

Dit is dan een BLACK Out.

De manier waarop ons elektriciteitsnetwerk is opgebouwd en de schakelingen die men in de controlekamers van TSO en DSO’s uitvoert, leiden ertoe dat de schade meestal beperkt blijft … waarna de technische ploegen uitrukken om alles te herstellen.

Soms kan men de problemen voorzien. Zoals nu.
En dan kan men, vooraleer het evenwicht plots verstoord wordt en de gevolgen onoverzienbaar worden, beslissen een stuk verbruik “weg te knippen”. Men gaat dus een groot aantal elektriciteitsverbruikers bewust afschakelen, voor eventjes of voor langer, éénmalig of elke dag tijdens een kritieke periode (bv. de winter).

Als zo’n stroom”panne” bewust wordt gecreëerd, spreekt men van een BROWN Out.

 
 

Het nationale afschakelplan

De Belgische wetgeving voor de veiligheid van het elektriciteitsnet beschrijft ook de principes van een nationaal afschakelplan.
 
Dit is een technisch plan waarin beschreven wordt welke geografische gebieden (groepen van gemeentes, gemeentes of delen daarvan) onder welke omstandigheden kunnen afgeschakeld worden om te voorkomen dat het hele Belgische net in mekaar stort en er dus een ongewenste totale nationale BLACK Out ontstaat.
 
Het afschakelplan is enerzijds een louter technisch plan, omdat het zich moet baseren op wat technisch mogelijk is (waar welke transformatorposten via welke kabels welke straten en gemeentes met elkaar verbinden);
maar is anderzijds ook een bestuurlijk plan omdat het de overheid is die finaal de goedkeuring moet geven voor de voorgestelde prioriteit van afschakeling… (wie eerst, voor hoe lang, etc.).
De bedoeling van die “bestuurlijke beslissing” is er voor te zorgen dat de maatschappelijke schade zo klein mogelijk wordt gehouden: industriële centra zijn dus bijvoorbeeld belangrijker dan landbouwzones.
 
 
 

Licht uit … bij u?!

In de media van vorige week (15-aug) werd herhaaldelijk gemeld dat “de gemeenten niet weten of ze betrokken” zijn… en er dus geen noodplannen zijn of kunnen gemaakt worden…
Dit is een beetje een steriele probleemstelling natuurlijk, want de stroomproblematiek is al enkele jaren gekend én los daarvan kan op elk moment een transformator uitbranden of een hoogspanningslijn na een storm tegen de vlakte gaan.
Maar goed, het is een realiteit.
Vele gemeentes hebben nog niet de ervaring met voorbereiding op grootschalige en langdurige (meerdere uren, zich over meerdere dagen of weken herhalend) stroomonderbrekingen.
We hadden het tot nu toe ook nog niet nodig…

Is het moeilijk?

Noodplanning voor een Brown Out  is technisch gezien niet zo moeilijk, maar vergt een heel multi-disciplinaire aanpak, die de klassieke noodplanning (brandweer, medisch, politie) aanzienlijk overstijgt en waar het zwaartepunt zelfs niet ligt bij de klassieke hulpverlening…

Het zwaartepunt ligt bij het in kaart brengen van de ESSENTIELE centrale gemeentelijke processen en het voorbereiden van acties om die zo veel mogelijk te kunnen blijven doen …

Enkele voorbeelden:

 

Enkele voorbeelden dus, om aan te geven, dat het niet gaat over brandweerwagens en zandzakken, maar over logistiek, koelcellen, identiteitskaarten, GSM’s en een heleboel andere “praktische probleempjes”.

De belangrijkste problematiek zit evenwel in de veelal ongekende “interdependencies“: welke systemen hangen af van elektriciteit en creëren op hun beurt maatschappelijke problemen?

Internationaal wordt onderzoek gedaan naar de mogelijke interdependenties, maar ervaring van stroompannes in het buitenland leert ons veelal dat het identificeren van wat met wat verbonden is en tot wat leidt veelal een heel onvoorspelbare materie is.

 
 

Hulp nodig?

 

CEMAC werkt sinds 2006 voor de belangrijkste spelers binnen de Belgische elektriciteitssector: ontwikkeling van noodplannen, opleidingen, oefeningen.
Daardoor hebben we ook een grote expertise opgebouwd op het vlak van toepasselijk regelgevend kader, afschakelplan, noodmaatregelen, impact-analyse, noodplanning en dergelijke meer.

 

Zo beschikken we onder meer over een kern van Checklists die door lokale overheden kunnen gebruikt worden voor een impact-analyse of als leidraad bij het opstellen van nieuwe modules voor hun gemeentelijk noodplan.

 

CKL_municipal01
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Daarnaast hebben we “modules” – eigenlijk deelplannen die in het gemeentelijk noodplan kunnen ingevoegd worden – om de specifieke problematiek van Business Continuity aan te pakken.

 

*[ Onze kantoren zijn gesloten tot 24 augustus]*
*[ maar we blijven bereikbaar via e-mail. ]*
 

30 July 2004, the Ghislenghien gas pipeline explosion… 10 years.

Posted on July 29, 2014
Filed Under Newsbase, Uncategorized | Comments Off

[Zele] – Just before 09:00hr we received a telephone call from the operational crisis management centre of Fluxys, the Belgian natural gas pipeline operator.
Around 09:00 an explosion had occurred of a gas cloud that had escaped from a rupture in a DN1000 80bar gas pipeline on the industrial estate in the village of Ghislenghien, close to the city of Ath.

Gas Fire as it could be observed from the nearby highway (image: belga news agency)

Gas Fire as it could be observed from the nearby highway (image: belga news agency)


The pipeline transported up to 1.6 million cubic metres of natural gas between the terminal at Zeebrugge harbour and France. The pipeline operator performed an emergency closure of the mainline valves, but given the distance of more than 10 kilometres between the upstream and downstream valves, the jet fire of the “line pack” lasted for almost 2 hours (line pack: the total volume of gas in the pipeline in between two valves).
The explosion left 24 people dead and injured 132 people. Debris was projected up to 6km from the epicentre of the explosion.
Expert analysis showed that the leak occurred as consequence of “external aggression”, i.e. the scratching of the pipe wall by a mechanical excavator, with a wall thickness of 4mm instead of the nominal 10mm.

CEMAC and Fluxys
Starting in 2002 CEMAC was selected to organise Fluxys’ crisis management exercises. Over the years a number of Command Post Exercises (CPX), Field Training Exercises (FTX), Table Top Exercises (TTX) and mixed exercises (MCX) had been organised.
On 30 and 31 July, CEMAC assisted Fluxys in the co-ordination between the pipeline operator, the local emergency services and the national civil protection authorities.
In the following weeks, communication experts from CEMAC performed media studies to analyse the coverage of the catastrophe by the media, and more specifically the attributed role and responsibilities of the pipeline operator.

The Aftermath of the Accident
The analysis of the incident and the response to it lead to a number of new initiatives by all relevant national partners:

See also:

What First Responders in CBRN need to know …

Posted on May 8, 2014
Filed Under Uncategorized | Comments Off

[Brussels, BE] – Unknown to many, yet very valuable. NATO’s Civil Protection Group (CPG) has published in the second half of 2013 the brochure “The International CBRN Training Curriculum”, a set of standards and guidelines that define the minimum level of competence and training for first responders to CBRN (= HAZMAT) incidents.

NATO_CBRN_curriculum_p01A
 
 
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

Whilst the document contains – as it states on the cover page – only Minimum Standards and Non-Binding Guidelines, the principles, curriculum and objectives are universal and should be or become a source of inspiration for national authorities seeking to standardise or upgrade their national CBRN incident responder training programmes (Fire Fighters, Civil Protection staff, Military, Private Sector / Industry) or to develop CBRN incident response modules made ready for international deployment.

 
 
 
NATO_CBRN_curriculum_p02A

The brochure is structured along 10 “Learning Outcomes”:

 
 
 

The brochure is a publication of:
NATO International Staff, Civil-Military Planning & Support, Operations Division
and
NATO International Staff, EADRCC, Operations Division
publication code: 0945-13
 
Available in CEMAC Documentation Centre
 
 
 

Lexicon:
CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CPG: Civil Protection Group
EADRCC: Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Co-ordination Centre
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

 

CEMAC actively contributes to the projects of NATO’s Civil Protection Group.
Luc Rombout has been working for two years in the “Ad Hoc Working Group on the Liability of Relief Personnel” (more on this on the blog very soon) and is member of the Governance Committee in the “Multi-National Telemedicine for Emergency Situations” project.

CEMAC in New NATO Project — Telemedicine for Major Emergencies

Posted on February 18, 2014
Filed Under Uncategorized | Comments Off

[Brussels, BE] – The 13 & 14 February Kick-off Conference marked the start of a new and challenging R&D project in which we are involved.
Three nations: Romania, Russia and the United States of America co-chair the “Development of a Multi-national Telemedicine System” (MnTS) project embedded in the NATO-Russia Council and financially supported by the NATO Science for Peace and Security Programme.

The three year project aims at developing operational systems and both technical and operational standards on the use of telemedicine (TMED) for use during major emergencies required international collaboration for the medical operations (MEDOPS).

Luc ROMBOUT from CEMAC is one of very few national experts not belonging to one of the three primary partner counties, invited to bring his expertise to the project. He is member of the Governance Committee, one of the three committees in this project (the others being the Medical Committee and the ICT Committee).

The main tasks of the Governance Committee are the development of the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), the development of functional characteristics and further down in the project the development and assessment of a TMED exercise.

Experts and Guests during the Kick-Off Conference (NATO HQ)

Experts and Guests during the Kick-Off Conference (NATO HQ)

Additional information on the project will soon appear on the website of the NATO Science Programma www.nato.int/science

Looking Back – Coastal Flood Exercise (COFLEX 2008)

Posted on December 5, 2013
Filed Under Uncategorized | Comments Off

The warnings that the autumn storm Xaver might bring havoc to the lower countries brings back memories of the 2008 Coastal Flood Exercise “COFLEX” organised by CEMAC.

This exercise was made possible with European INTERREG funding and involved a scenario in which the provinces of West-Vlaanderen (Belgium) and Zeeland (the Netherlands) joined efforts to manage the consequences of a coastal flood along Belgian and Dutch coastal weak spots.

Impact stage - Water flooding the coastal cities.

Impact stage – Water flooding the coastal cities.

The scenario was based on mathematical flood models of the 1/1000 year storm with high Northern winds, extreme high tides and storm conditions.
A provincial crisis team from West-Vlaanderen was assembled in the Maritime Rescue Co-ordination Centre (MRCC) to cope with threats and challenges on the Belgian side, whilst the provincial crisis team from Zeeland worked from the provincial crisis centre in Middelburg.

mrcc

Belgian provincial crisis management staff

The exercise had a duration of two days and involved three stages of flood risk management (before the flood) and of flood consequence management (after the flood).

I. Initial stage (before the flood)
Participants were confronted with very adverse weather forecasts in the 48 / 24hr before the storm hitting shoreline time frame and were asked to assess the situation and if considered relevant, to develop a plan of preparations for actions if the situation would really turn bad.

II. Impact stage (storm coming ashore)
In a real time simulation of terrain events, information flows, media coverage, the two provincial crisis teams received injects over a period of five hours of the actual damage by the storm hitting the infrastructure, destroying coastal defences and the subsequent flood of several municipalities on the Belgian and Dutch coast. The teams were confronted with evacuation requests, impact on utilities and infrastructure, SAR, Recce and damage assessment, casualty care and communications about fatalities, international logistics, and numerous other aspects of this multi-faceted emergency management.

III. Consequence management stage (24hr after the flood)
With parts of the region still flooded and receding water at other places, the focus of emergency management had to shift towards the organisation of longer term shelter for evacuees, aerial delivery of supplies to people stuck in buildings and the complex recovery effort in zones where the water had receded.

Not only an exercise, also an EMERGENCY PLAN

BE-NL Coastal Flood Emergency Plan

BE-NL Coastal Flood Emergency Plan

The exercise was also a test for the Pilot “Bi-national Coastal Flood Emergency Plan” developed by CEMAC as part of the same European Project “Chain of Safety” and delivered to the authorities of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.
This emergency plan was developed by a team of experts from CEMAC and validated through a team of experts from all of the participating nations.
The “pilot version” covered the specific requirements, processes and procedures to facilitate Belgian-Dutch collaboration and co-ordination in case of coastal floods.

Chain of Safety logo

Chain of Safety logo

Typhoon Yolanda (Haiyan) … what after that?

Posted on November 14, 2013
Filed Under Uncategorized | Comments Off

An editorial post by Luc Rombout, Global Director of Communications of IAEM (International Association of Emergency Managers) and senior consultant at CEMAC.

 

We do not care …
Emergency managers do not really care that much about the “probability” of events and the actual underlying causes.

We do not focus on whether the typhoon that hit the Philippines last week is caused by structural climate change, which in turn could be men’s fault or is merely an unrelated meteorological anomaly.
For emergency managers the probability is always “1“.

And that probability = “1″ is always considered both in the preparatory phase (when you make an emergency plan and prepare an organisation or society) as well as in the response phase.
“THE thing” has happened, whatever the cause. It is time to manage the consequences in the most effective and efficient manner, with the least loss of life, damage to property and the environment.

As such, emergency managers should not be the people who make statements about the relevance, truth and impact of climate change. We are not there to add to that body of knowledge on causality of crises, because our core competences are not there.
We should not make statements about that, because they will only stir discussions about the relevance and truth of things.
The essential element being that we avoid entering the playing ground of semi-political agendae that ultimately disrupt the inherent neutrality of Disaster Relief Operations (DRO), Emergency Management (EM) or whatever one wishes to call it.
DRO is a neutral humanitarian activity – or at least it is supposed to be that.

THE thing has happened, a natural disaster.
Once more, and it will not be the last time.

 

We do care …
The modern day emergency manager should have a holistic view on risks and how to manage them. Times where you just sit and wait for the next emergency call to arrive after which you deploy are things of the past.
Risks are inherent to our presence as humans on this planet Earth. Some are ‘acts of nature’ (like falling meteorites, infectious diseases and tropical storms), while others are ‘acts of man’ (like transportation accidents, industrial accidents, terrorism).

Modern day risk management for the emergency manager means that he is involved in the development of major scenario lines, the development of an adequate emergency plan, the sourcing of sufficient logistics to make the plan operable, the training of the people required to implement the plan and the organisation of exercises.

But the main issue with “catastrophic events” like tsunamis, typhoons, earthquake or a pandemic, is that the mere scale and response complexity is such that it is not that easy to make THE emergency plan for such an event or to just go out and organise an exercise.

So there is a problem of methodological approach.

In addition, crises like what has happened in the Philippines are such in nature that the fundamental fabric of society, the operational cohesion through the existence of communication lines, hospitals, access to drinking water, fuels, other utilities and shelter, has dissolved.
Emergency responders can no longer arrive by air or land and “plug in” their telecom systems and refuel their 4×4 vehicles – because all the network components have just disappeared.

So there is a basic problem of societal disintegration.

 

Operational Complexity and Burden Sharing
The observation that in the Philippines, like in Haiti and after several other disasters, the scale of needs and international solidarity are thus that one sees the arrival of dozens of domestic and international disaster relief organisations and emergency responders, without any “scenario” to operate by and without the relative luxury of infrastructure remained intact or at least operational makes DRO in these cases operationally very complicated.

 

Building a domestic permanent and integrated emergency response capability for such crises is inconceivable.

The Philippines cannot do that, the United States of America cannot, Belgium cannot.
Thus emergency response (e.g. Urban Search & Rescue, Medical Operations) and disaster relief (e.g. sheltering of people, supply of food, re-establishment of basic medical care) require and are based upon rapid integrated international response under a clear command with effective and efficient implementation of the operational priorities throughout the entire stricken zone.

 

Citizens who have lost everything and who have no food, no shelter and no medical care cannot wait for days – whatever the conditions on the ground.

 

New Operational Models
The current crisis clearly illustrates once more the need for co-ordinated speed-as-lighting large scale emergency response and disaster relief capabilities.
Traditionally we view this as the in situ deployment of rescue personnel, medical staff, damage assessors and other first-responders, but there is much more … and it should be developed much more, because many of these initiatives can be boosted with limited funding and without some of the barriers linked with a physical deployment of personnel (border crossing, transportation, visa, diploma recognition, subordination of command, …).

One such initiative, but there are many, is the “Digital Humanitarian Network“, a consortium of Volunteer and Technical Communities (V&TC) as they call themselves … or in simple words: a virtual network of organisations and individuals who bring their expertise and time to perform support operations that can be done “from a distance”.

digitalhumanitarians_com

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

One of the member organisations is the Standby Volunteer Task Force focusing on the exploitation of geo-spacial information, monitoring of traditional and social media, social media data verification, periodical synoptic reporting, …

 

sbtf_screenshot

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

They are mere illustrations of a positive evolution whereby we “pull resources” even if they are not embedded in the traditional governmental / institutional organisations (UN, EU, NATO, individual nations, …) or not a traditional DRO NGO (Médecins sans frontières, ICRC/IFRC, …).

“As a member of the Global Board of the International Association of Emergency Managers, I regularly come into contact with sometimes unique expertise, but lacking any framework that will support them if they wish to make their expertise available at the moment when it counts“.
That expertise is very diverse and can prove very valuable for responders who are sometimes in great need for information, advice, knowledge.

Experts in utility systems restoration, experts in command & control set-up, construction engineers with expertise in damage assessment, pollution management experts, transport logisticians, trauma psychologists, crisis communications experts, … I even met a specialist veterinarian who specialised in animal cadaver management after floods …

Virtual communities do not replace the “boots on the ground” emergency response, but they can provide a very valuable support by:

 

Moving forward
The occurrence of “off scale” emergency situations stresses the need to take action to maximise in the future the global response capability, from whatever source or part of the world, as long as it is humanitarian-neutral and of good quality.
But there are some issues … and as a body of professionals, the emergency management community should be conscious of those and try to find solutions for the remaining problems.
Let us name a few:

 

Some useful information
Pulling a human being from a collapsed building is a universal process.
It is done the same way irrespective of race, country of origin or organisation the emergency responders belong to.
 
 
Administering first aid is a universal process.
It is done the same way irrespective of race, country of origin or organisation the doctor or paramedic belong to.
 
 
As such, our profession must pull the knowledge from where it is and aim for maximum adoption by the emergency response community and by national and supra-national entities.
And in that respect I would like to bring into the spotlight, four initiatives:

  1. The OSLO Guidelines: Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief (UN-OCHA)
     
  2. The BUDAPEST Guidelines II: on Crisis Communications (NATO EADRCC)
     
  3. EU Host Nation Support Guidelines (EU DG-ECHO / ERC)
     
  4. Technical Arrangement on the Liability of Relief Personnel [in international Disaster Relief Operations] (NATO CPG Ad Hoc Working Group(*))

oslo_guidelines

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

(*) Luc Rombout is member of this international ad hoc working group tasked with the development of a Handbook and Model Clauses to resolve potential liability issues between Sending Nation and Host Nations during international disaster relief operations (such as the deployments to the Philippines).

 
The Belgian minister of Foreign Affairs, mr. Didier REYNDERS launched an appeal today to uplift initiatives like the Belgian B-FAST team (info in Dutch) to the European level.

“Great … and I certainly support the idea, but he should be (even) more ambitious!”

 
Entities such as B-FAST deliver vital on-scene operational and technical support with USAR (Urban Search & Rescue), (para)medic and logistical staff.

But the holistic approach must be to identify:

Disaster response is a “universal” enterprise, remember …
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

SARTISS 2013 – A lustrum edition

Posted on October 17, 2013
Filed Under Uncategorized | Comments Off

sartiss01_sm

(Baile-Felix, RO) – CEMAC was invited for the fifth consecutive time to participate actively in the SARTISS conference, held in the Spa Resort village of Baile-Felix, Romania.
SARTISS started as a small initiative five years ago, bringing together practitioners from Mountain Rescue, Fire Brigade and Medical emergency services in an attempt to develop a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency platform to exchange ideas and promote co-operation.

Luc ROMBOUT: “I remember the first SARTISS conference were the number of participants was rather low and were people moved as being on thin ice.
It was new to everybody. This year’s SARTISS brought over 600 people together in a much more interactive and productive structure. National and international experts were invited to bring in knowhow and a lot of that was taken into workshops, round table discussions and other creative forms of participation between experts and participants.”

“From being a ‘SAR’ conference, it has become the main platform in Romania to discuss the broad field of emergency and crisis management. A lot of senior officers, policy makers and some members of government participate actively in the discussions and try to give a follow-up to what is advised or developed during SARTISS.

Luc Rombout was there again (making it his fourth time) and was asked to address the topic of “Individual and organisational learning“.
He covered the psycho-physical process of learning, diverse learning techniques using the “skills pyramid”, the organisation of exercises and concluded with various tips and tricks at organisational level, such as the development of competence matrices and the creation of multi-annual exercise plans.

In addition Luc Rombout chaired a workshop on the “Common Operational Picture” (COP). The focus in the discussion was how to tackle the real life problems that have been observed when trying to introduce a operational-tactical-strategic COP in Romania. The workshop delivered a set of recommendations for short and mid-term implementation.

Finally Luc Rombout was one of the panel members of the Round Table on “Romanian Emergency Management in the next decade”, chaired by dr. Raed ARAFAT (Romanian Minister of Health).

Both strategic level and operational level topics were subject to lively discussions: Black Swans and the robustness of society, resilience, new threats, centralisation vs decentralisation … up to materials and appliances investment programmes.

Panel discussion, with experts from Belgium (CEMAC), France (SFMC, Netherlands (Min.V&J), Romania and UK

Panel discussion, with experts from Belgium (CEMAC), France (SFMC), Netherlands (Min.V&J), Romania and UK.

Godinne Train Accident

Posted on September 25, 2013
Filed Under Uncategorized | Comments Off

Brussels, 25 September 2013 – the Belgian national crisis centre “CGCCR” hosted a lessons learned session on the train accident that occurred in the village of Godinne on 11 May 2012.
The presentations of that lessons learned session can be found at:
CGCCR page in Dutch
CGCCR page in French

keep looking »